



# THE SUNSET CLUB

1898-99

# EIGHTY-EIGHTH MEETING

FEBRUARY 3, 1898

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ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FIVE PRESENT

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SUBJECT:

## THE ANNEXATION OF HAWAII

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CHAIRMAN: MR. DAVID B. LYMAN

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ADDRESSES BY

MR. GEORGE WHEELER HINMAN

MR. CLARENCE S. DARROW

GENERAL DISCUSSION BY

MR. WILLIAM J. MARSHALL

MR. SULLIVAN

MR. JOSEPH W. HINER

MR. JESSE A. BALDWIN

MR. CARL STROEVER

MR. W. J. STRONG



## EIGHTY-EIGHTH MEETING,

*Held at the Palmer House, Thursday, February 3, 1898.*

*One Hundred and Thirty-Five Present.*

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## THE ANNEXATION OF HAWAII.

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THE SECRETARY: Gentlemen, We have for discussion this evening the very interesting and timely subject of the annexation of Hawaii. I have given a slight advantage to the affirmative of this question by conferring the chairmanship of the evening upon a gentleman who was born in the Hawaiian Islands. But as he has promised not to take sides in the controversy the advantage will probably be a very slight one.

I find upon consulting the dictionary that the fact that he was born in the Hawaiian Islands makes him a native thereof; and I have been the more glad to have with us this evening one of the natives of the Hawaiian Islands, because so much of the argument for and against annexation hinges upon the character of the natives. We cannot have failed to observe, any of us, that one of the most tenaciously advanced arguments of the opponents of annexation is based upon the fact that the natives are an inferior race, unsuited for self-government and unfit to be amalgamated with the body of our civilization. In fact, I notice that the matter is put even stronger than I have put it in the resolutions adopted by the Commercial Club of this city at their meeting on last Saturday evening, in which it is said they are "semi-savage or Orientals and can never become good citizens or be submissive to the rule of constitutional law."

I must say that the chairman of the evening did not meet my ideas of what a native of the Sandwich Islands was when I first saw him and asked him to preside this evening—seated in a richly upholstered swivel chair, before a mahogany desk, in a luxuriously furnished office, clothed as I was clothed, only better, and speaking the same language that I spoke with great fluency. But I know of no appeal from the dictionary in these matters; and I need hardly remind the club that no man is responsible for the place or the condition in which he is born, and that even a Sandwich Islander, while among us, is our brother, and entitled to the full protection of the constitution and the laws.

Our brother left his savage home amid the plantains and the palm trees many years ago and came to this center of progress and culture, plunging with great success into the current of our business and professional activities. He has, as I have said, learned our language and customs, learned to dress as we dress, and I am credibly informed that he has abjured all heathen practices, at least so far as was necessary to permit him to engage in the practice of law. But I see, gentlemen, your curiosity will brook no further delay, and I proceed to draw the curtain and disclose to your inquisitive gaze one of the natives of the Sandwich Islands, Mr. David B. Lyman, President of the Chicago Title and Trust Company, who for the next two hours will enjoy the still greater distinction of presiding over the Sunset Club.

MR. LYMAN: Mr. Secretary and Members of the Sunset Club:

I thought as I sat here listening to your able Secretary that he was presenting the long and short of this matter. While I cannot overtop him, yet I am forcibly reminded of an occasion for which I was not responsible, which made me a resident for a time of the "Sunny Isle" of the North Pacific, and I assure you, gentlemen, that I find in meeting my fellow citizens that a large portion of their information as to the character, the customs, the morals, etc., of those far-off people is derived from our pictorial papers, that usually represent us as semi-savage barbarians, with woolly hair, flat noses, thick lips and short skirts. Of course in this climate on an evening like this we are obliged to forego short skirts.

The question before us is one on which the Chairman must express no opinion. He will try to be strictly impartial. He may allude, I suppose, to a few matters which may be of interest, which are historical, and which present the environments of the question, and perhaps aid a little in solving some of the difficult problems which come before us.

In my earliest infancy I remember looking with admiration upon the flag of Great Britain which waved triumphantly and peacefully over the entire tribe, as Lord Admiral George Pollock had pulled down the Hawaiian flag and taken possession, and in the name of

his or her Britannic Majesty, I do not remember which it was, had annexed that island to Great Britain. That state of things continued for a few months, and then the flag of Hawaii was restored, and the restoration of the flag was celebrated for many and many a year, when on the 31st of July the people all celebrated the independence of the monarchy.

The question of the final disposition of the island has always been a troublesome one ever since the time when Captain Cook was disposed of shortly after he discovered the island. Occasionally a Japanese junk would float in stranded on to the islands, and I do not know in those early days, long before my time, before the islands were christianized or civilized, what disposition was made of those Orientals. I suppose they became absorbed with the people and became an integral part of the race, in what way I will not say. But this question of the final disposition of the islands I heard discussed from the time I was but an infant. There was not an English admiral or a French admiral or a commodore of the United States that sat down at the table to break bread who was not always talking about what would become of the islands. The Englishman said he hoped it would become a part of her Britannic Majesty's possessions. They needed it. The Frenchman was equally positive in that way. And the American, with more modesty, said we don't know what will happen. In 1850, 1851 and 1852 the French made vigorous advances and a treaty of annexation was actually negotiated. I think General Webster was the Secretary of State at that time and President Pierce was the President. It was agreed to by all the natives, the nobles, the monarchy, and it failed only on account of the death of the king before it was finally signed. The question, as I say, has been up in various forms. But a new state of things gradually came up in the Pacific, and it has forced a question upon us which we would gladly postpone—the islanders would gladly postpone. When the reciprocity treaty was passed, Secretary Bayard, discussing the question, said that he hoped it would provide an easy solution of this entire question, as under the reciprocity treaty American interests and capital would go in until the island had become Americanized and assimilated to America and then this entire question would solve itself. Instead of Japanese junks floating on to the shores of the island, now war ships come, equipped with all modern armament, built in the latest American and European styles, and the people are pouring into the islands, and adopting exactly the policy which Secretary Bayard advocated for Americanizing the islands.

Now one question which I hope will be solved here to-night—I do not express an opinion upon it—is how this nation which has faded away—the aborigines are gone or almost so—they are a fraction of the population at the present time, and when the Japan-

ese have come in there and were coming in there at the rate of 2,000 a year, when they formed the larger portion of the adult male population of the islands, shrewd, keen, aggressive Yankees of the East, who will as they go on become capitalists and property holders, who are now demanding the right of suffrage in a republic, the spirit of which is to extend suffrage to all classes—how suffrage can be kept from them—and if the suffrage passes into their hands and if they become the party in control and have a Japanese president, Japanese governor, Japanese constables, Japanese everything else, whether the question will not gradually solve itself. We have reached a point where this question seems to be pressing upon us, and the statesmen, the generals, the naval officers who have been studying it for years have expressed their opinions. But there are many difficulties surrounding it, many objections to it which will be urged here to-night, and it is a live issue, one which should be carefully and honestly considered. The islands are a small speck on the universe. Here is the great Southern Pacific, a body of water which is large enough to cover the entire continent of Africa, and the United States would swallow them all up. Here is this little speck right in the center of that entire ocean, and, as the naval officers and generals say, commanding to a large extent that great ocean. Now it is a singular state of facts, which confronts us to-day. I am not going to express any opinion upon it, and I shall listen with pleasure, as all will, to the arguments which will be urged for and against.

In speaking of Chicago I am reminded of two little circumstances. When I came to this country—I will say I never was a free-born American. I am a simple barbarian and I have managed to get along in Chicago, because we have so many nationalities I suppose, and there is nothing strange to be found in Chicago. And when I came to these shores and went to college I hailed innocently from the Sandwich Islands, and during my entire college course going around through the farming community I answered the stereotyped questions of "Now, can you milk a cow?" "Do you have cows on the island?" And when I came to a commercial point I had all sorts of questions. So when I went to the law school at Cambridge I entered my name as coming from Chicago. I thought then that I would go to Chicago to settle, and I thought I might just as well burn the bridges behind me and take Chicago in advance. After I had been in the school for some five months a delegation waited on me one day from the law school and they said, "Lyman, we want to ask you one question. You have been among us some five months and we have been watching you, and we have just found out you came from the Hawaiian Islands. Now, why on earth didn't you hail from the Hawaiian Islands when you came here? We know all about the Hawaiian Islands. We know the people

out there are all right. But when we found you were from Chicago, where everything is bad, we were very suspicious of you, and we have only just found you out and now we are going to take you into our arms and our hearts, even though you say you are from Chicago."

When I was in Yale we had for discussion in our junior year, "The Pacific Railroad; Will It Ever Be Built, and if Built, Will It Ever Be Operated?" We all studied the question from our old geographies, which showed the great American desert; we took all the history of the past of this country and other countries and wrote learned disquisitions. The ideal of Yale College, the most learned professor there, a man who was deep in the lore of the past, whom we loved and admired, summed up the question in a few words: "The Pacific Railroad will never be built, and if built it never can be operated, because it runs through such a vast desert." Within three or four years I landed in Chicago and the first object that greeted my eyes was a procession several miles in length, carts, horses, banners, nationalities of all kinds, and I asked, "What does this mean?" "Why," they said, "this is in celebration of the opening of the Pacific Railroad." And I looked back through my college career and thought, "Well, is it possible that college professors ever make mistakes?" And when I read the papers last Sunday morning the same question came to my mind.

Now, gentlemen, I trust I have said nothing biased on either side. If there is anything on which I can throw light as to the manners and customs of the people, their dress, their morals or anything else, that is a question which I suppose it is permitted to express an opinion on. I will say that as far as our aborigines, semi-barbarians, half-savages, are concerned, they are as intelligent, as moral, and perhaps more so, and as well off as a large portion of our voters in the city of Chicago. I think we could assimilate them.

It only remains for me to say that there will be from twenty to twenty-five minutes given to each side for the opening of this interesting discussion, and I am requested to say that the guests who are present are cordially invited to participate in the question which is before us to-night. It is not confined to members.

I have the pleasure of introducing to you as the first speaker in the affirmative, Mr. George Wheeler Hinman, the editor-in-chief of *The Inter-Ocean*, who will present the claims in favor of annexation.

MR. HINMAN: Gentlemen of the Sunset Club: When your secretary called on me with a request that I speak briefly to you regarding Hawaii, I felt exceedingly reluctant to address such a representative body of men on such a momentous subject. As a com-

paratively young man in new surroundings, I regarded it as hardly fitting that I should come forward as the advocate of a cause which, we all know, is of transcendent national and international importance. In spite of my tentative acceptance of your secretary's invitation, I had decided on Saturday to send my regrets to him. On Sunday, gentlemen, I was astounded to read that the Commercial Club of this city had placed itself on record against annexation. You know the circumstances. You doubtless have read Prof. Von Holst's address and the proceedings of the meeting which were in harmony with it. You learned therefrom that a student of world-wide reputation had lent the full weight of his name to the anti-annexationists, and that he was supported in this by a gentleman who has been so conspicuous in the affairs of this city and State that, not many years ago, he was a candidate for the office of Secretary of State. I refer, of course, to Mr. Melville E. Stone. You learned and I learned that the attitude of these two gentlemen was approved by the Commercial Club.

Under these circumstances, gentlemen, I felt that it was the duty of every American patriot, no matter how inadequate his preparation or how strong his prejudices against public speaking, to do and to say what he could in favor of our traditional policy of annexation.

For what reason do we wish to annex Hawaii? First, for self-defense. We wish the islands because we do not want any other nation to take them and fortify them against us; because we do not wish to have our west coast threatened by a foreign power as our east coast is threatened from the Bermudas; because we do not wish to be in steel clamps whenever we assert the Monroe doctrine as we did for the benefit of Brazil five years ago and for the benefit of Venezuela more recently; because we do not wish to give away the key to the western gate of the Nicaragua Canal before we build that waterway. For years Hawaii has been known to the publicists of the world as "the key of the Pacific," "the Gibraltar of the Pacific," "the Cross Roads of the Pacific." It is all three. Look at the map, gentlemen. You will find that Hawaii is 3,800 miles from Auckland, 5,000 miles from Hong Kong, and 3,400 miles from Yokohama, while it is but 2,000 miles from San Francisco. You will find that in the whole Pacific Ocean from the equator on the south to Alaska on the north, from China and Japan in the far east to the coast of our own continent, there is but one place where coal and provisions can be obtained, and that place is Hawaii. Hawaii is the natural mistress of the Pacific. Naval vessels cannot fight without coal any more than an army can fight without commissary stores. The distances from Australia and Asia to our Pacific coast are prohibitive to foreign squadrons. Only with Hawaii as a base of hostile operations, but 2,000 miles from San Francisco, is our Pa-

cific coast open to attack from Asia or Australia. But, says Prof. Von Holst, England has a naval station near at hand on the west Canadian coast. We cannot hold her vessels off by acquiring Hawaii. And because we are at a disadvantage in this respect with England, shall we be willing, nay eager, to place ourselves at the same disadvantage with any other nation? Shall we say to the world: There is one foreign coaling station at our western gates, therefore let all or any who will, help themselves to more? Are we willing, because England has Vancouver, to let France, or Japan, or Germany, or Russia, take Hawaii? The distinguished gentleman seems to reason that because we have said A B C we must say X Y Z. That may be logic, but it is not politics or diplomacy, nor has it ever been recognized as such by our national government; otherwise we should have let France settle without protest in Mexico, merely because England sat fast in Canada, and should have allowed the European powers to restore a subsidized and protected monarchy in Brazil merely because there was a crown colony in Central America. Because England has at hand a naval port easily assailable by land, shall we invite any and all comers to take a port practically unassailable by sea or land? We might be obliged to spend money in fortifying Hawaii, but there is absolutely no authority for the statement that the sum would be oppressively large. Besides every million spent at Honolulu would afford our west coast more protection than \$10,000,000 spent on our mainland and would give us double the assurance in case of war. Because of the enormous distances from Australia, New Zealand and Asia and the difficulties of coaling, Hawaii once in our hands and moderately fortified, would be one of the most difficult ports in the world to attack.

I would like to illustrate the situation in this respect with an incident from our Civil War. Some of you gentlemen may have been at Gettysburg. All of you have read of the great battle. You remember that when Longstreet was about to make his famous charge across the valley of death, General Meade sent out General Warren to learn the disposition of the troops, and General Warren found little Round Top standing out, bare and undefended, from the Union position. What a trivial thing that small hill might seem to the civilian student, viewing war from Prof. Von Holst's standpoint! An isolated point, almost an outpost. Was it not Meade's duty to hold his forces compactly together to withstand Longstreet's charge? Was it not a weakening of his resisting force to place the Fifth Corps on that exposed hill top to hold it against the onslaught of Longstreet's men? According to Prof. Von Holst's ideas of defensive warfare, it no doubt was; but military history shows that, on the defense of Little Round Top, there was shattered the strength of Longstreet's host. Little Round Top was the key to the whole Union position, Warren has said. Hawaii is the

key to our whole Pacific coast in case of war. I might quote Captain Mahan, General Schofield, Admiral Belknap and a score of other high officers in both services in support of this contention. Schofield has said that the Hawaiian Islands "constitute the only natural outpost to the defenses of the Pacific coast." But it is useless to multiply the quotations from authorities; we all know them.

Yet, in spite of all, Prof. Von Holst says we are invulnerable. Invulnerable—that is an imposing word, gentlemen, especially when supported by other words equally imposing, but unfortunately, it loads no guns, it defends no sea coast, it upholds no international right; it is, in fact, only a word. It might be a pleasant diversion for us civilians here in the middle West, sitting in our offices, to utter such a word, and pin our faith to it, but, gentlemen, had Prof. Von Holst taken his "invulnerable" to New York, Boston, Savannah, Seattle, Tacoma or San Francisco, just two years ago, when we were in the midst of the excitement over the Venezuela controversy, he would have sounded its praises in vain, for confidence would have been weakened and stocks would have fallen, though he shouted "invulnerable" on every street corner, for all the world knows we are not "invulnerable." Not a military or naval authority in Europe agrees with Prof. Von Holst on this point. Even Li Hung Chang, when in this country, told us that little Japan could conquer us.

For what reason do we wish to annex Hawaii? To develop our commerce. A generation ago our wisest statesmen looked forward to the day when the Pacific trade would bloom until it would rival the commerce of the Atlantic. For decades European publicists have foretold the wonders of the commercial revolution in the days when East Asia would be thrown open to the traders of Europe and America. The wonders are about to begin. The China-Japan war marked the commencement of this commercial revolution; the seizure of Kiao Chou shows the rapidity of its progress. Unless all signs fail, an empire of 400,000,000 souls is about to be precipitated upon the world's markets and that empire is a Pacific power. If you are inclined to think all this an idle tale, gentlemen, look at the European powers now struggling at the verge of war in a Herculean contest for the commerce of the future. These powers have just as hard headed manufacturers, just as sagacious statesmen, just as calculating ship owners behind them as there are in the world. Are they struggling for a mere fancy? Are they risking war for a splendid dream? Hardly, gentlemen. They are striving for the great treasure house whose key is offered us to-day, whose key we hesitate to take. Hawaii is the clearing house of the Pacific to-day; she is to be the clearing house in the marvelous Pacific of the future. She is and will remain the cross roads of the traders that come and go between Asia and the Americas and be-

tween North America and Australia. At Honolulu there will be gathered as in a man's hand, the lines of commerce that bind the Americas, the Orient, and the continent of the South Sea. We negotiate reciprocity treaties; we pass navigation laws; we subsidize steamships; we send commercial missionaries abroad; we support consuls at foreign ports—all to develop our foreign trade and strengthen our merchant marine. Yet here is an opportunity offered us—an opportunity that once rejected we never can recall—to do more for our commerce and our shipping than all our laws and officials combined can accomplish in twenty-five years, and we hesitate, we falter, we split hairs, we rake the population of the earth for objectors, we call commercial rivals to our side, we ask them for advice, and when, with ostentatious disinterest they warn us against accepting this rich present, we pass resolutions thanking them for their kindness. And this brings me to another point.

For what reason do we wish to annex Hawaii and to annex it now? In general, we wish to annex Hawaii because such annexation would be in harmony with our traditional policy, the policy established by the men who laid the foundations of this great republic, who knew no higher ideal than its success, and who strove for that success without deferring to the scheming advice of our envious friends abroad. Our fathers and grandfathers were an annexing people. They annexed Louisiana with all its Indians; they annexed Florida with more Indians; they annexed Texas with its Mexicans and Indians; they annexed the vast country covered by the Mexican cession of 1848 with more Mexicans and Indians; they annexed the borderland delimited in the Gadsden purchase with more Mexicans and Indians; and they annexed Alaska with no inhabitants but Arctic Indians. We have thus annexed more than 3,500,000 square miles of territory, on not one square mile of which did we find a homogeneous population. And, gentlemen, we also annexed Midway Island, in the Pacific Ocean—an island 1,200 miles further from San Francisco than Honolulu. And now, after our fathers and our grandfathers, as well as the present generation, have annexed all this vast territory, some contiguous and some not, some for military reasons, some for commercial reasons, and some for reasons of general policy, after we have taken hundreds of thousands of people who never could become amalgamated with the older stock of the republic, and after we have set the seal of unanimous approval upon all these annexations, we are told suddenly by Prof. Bryce of London, Mr. Tori Hoshu of Tokio and Prof. Von Holst, but recently of Freiburg, that the annexation of Hawaii, to which we are bound by military and commercial reasons of almost compelling force, would imperil our welfare, would violate our traditions and would endanger the homogeneity of our population. And, gentlemen, with our own history open before us, with

the examples of our greatest patriots and wisest statesmen before our eyes, we thank these latter day saviors for delivering us from the bondage of our diplomatic tradition and we pass resolutions begging Congress to ignore the authority of Webster, Jackson, Seward, Marcy, Blaine, Grant, Harrison and McKinley and to pin its faith to the advice of Bryce, Von Holst and Tori Hoshu.

And why must we take Hawaii now? Because it is our last chance to take the islands peaceably. This is an era of land hunting and colonial confiscation. Since 1880 Germany, France and England have been scouring the face of the earth for new colonies. They have seized four million square miles of territory and are now on the verge of war over the vast opportunity afforded by the coming disintegration of China. Not one of these powers but has an itching palm for Hawaii; if you do not believe this, turn to the current literature of their capital cities. England, France and Russia have taken possession of Hawaii four times in the last eighty-five years. If we refuse the islands, what has been done four times can and will be done again. The fact that Hawaii has not been finally and conclusively seized before, is no conclusive argument for the future. The overthrow of the monarchy brought the whole question of the group's future in flux—brought it in flux in this most perilous period of land grabbing and land confiscation. But, some say, wait and see. Yes, gentlemen, wait and see, if you wish this country to face the dread alternative of supineness or war. Does anybody imagine that Japan or England, once in possession of the islands, would give them up at our suggestion? Of course, gentlemen, this is all a question of foresight, and not one of conclusive proof; that feature is peculiar to most problems of statesmanship. I do not know that any man yet has boasted the conclusiveness of his plea, for or against annexation, except Prof. Von Holst and he doubtless did so a trifle thoughtlessly. And just because of the inconclusiveness of the special arguments, I say: Follow the traditions of our fathers and our grandfathers. Follow them, not only because they have proved correct in the past, but because they have pointed for fifty years to the annexation policy in the present case. Beginning in 1842, with the special message of President Tyler, there has been an almost unbroken line of declarations in favor of American control, and then of American annexation of the islands. In more recent times we have the advice of Grant, of Arthur, of Harrison, of McKinley, harmonizing with the annexation policy laid out by Marcy and by Seward and advocated by John W. Foster and James G. Blaine.

Gentlemen, Prof. Von Holst has told us that he has a lofty conception of the destiny of this republic; a conception, however, quite different from that entertained by the American people. Now, gentlemen, when ideals are in question, authorities cease to im-

press us and every man is entitled to his own. And as an American who drew his first breath on American soil, who has lived his life on that soil, and who will die on that soil, who has never owed foreign allegiance and who never will, I venture to speak for a few of the 70,000,000 from whom Prof. Von Holst differs in his conception of our national destiny.

We have supposed, as did our fathers and grandfathers in the wilderness, that the genius of this republic looked onward and upward, that she was the embodiment of the spirit of an expansive and progressive people. We have thought of her as a mother, powerful and bountiful, stretching forth her arm to dot the oceans with our sails, to fill the world's ports with our ships, to gather into her hand the golden threads of commerce and bind them fast to our shores. We have expected her to lead us side by side with the foremost in the contest for all that is worth a nation's winning in this world. We have expected her to grasp for us the prize and bring to us the wealth, the power, and the peace that comes with wealth and power. We have expected from her the national prosperity and pride and splendor of the Rome that was, the England that is, and the Russia and Germany that are to be.

Gentlemen, as Prof. Von Holst has said, the Hawaiian question is of momentous importance. In facing it, we stand at the parting of the ways. On the one side we see the road traveled by every nation that has made history worth the telling—the road followed by the Adamases, the Jeffersons, the Monroes, the Polks, the Websters, the Seward, the Grants and the Blaines; the road that they traveled with honor to themselves and with glory to the nation, and the road that our ablest presidents and keenest statesmen have advised the American people to choose.

On the other side we see the road along which the less ambitious peoples of the earth have traveled to fulfill their modest destiny, without virile energy, without aggressive enterprise, without high hopes, without great aims—simply content to exist and fill space and leave the burden of civilization and progress to the masculine minds of other lands. This is the road, gentlemen, recommended to us by Prof. James Bryce of London, by Prof. Von Holst, until recently of Freiburg, by Mr. Tori Hoshu of Tokio and by a host of the other advisers in the capitals of the Old World and the far East. You see, gentlemen, that at the last, it is a matter of choice. Which shall it be, gentlemen, which shall it be?

**THE CHAIRMAN:** Gentlemen, I have great pleasure in introducing the leading speaker on the negative side of the question, a gentleman who needs no introduction and who never says anything that is not worth listening to, Mr. Clarence A. Darrow.

→ MR. DARROW: Gentlemen of the Sunset Club: The discussion of this question to-night, and at this time in America, is a demonstration that human nature has not changed much in two thousand years, that human nature is about what it was when the Macedonian king sat himself down to weep because there were no more worlds to conquer. The speaker who has espoused the affirmative this evening I think represents the class of people who are urging this nation from the well-founded and well-grounded precedents of the past to go off on to a wild excursion of jingoism into unknown seas in foreign lands. As has been said by the speaker this evening, it is a momentous occasion, it is a parting of the ways. I do not believe that any serious body or serious people would ever dream of going two thousand miles into the Pacific Ocean to annex seventy miles square of land if that was all it meant. Why, we would think from the proposition, and the way this matter is spoken of this evening, and generally spoken of, that Hawaii was right across State street ready to be taken if we reached out our hands, certainly was as near as the Bahamas and Cuba and the islands on the eastern coast.

We have heard this evening two reasons why we should annex Hawaii. First, on account of our commerce, and second, on account of the prospects or the hopes of war, which ever they may call it. I am surprised—and still I am not surprised, for I know how many forget to think—but I ought to be surprised that any body of men who supported Mr. McKinley and his policy, should believe in the glory of commerce or care anything about it. Have we not passed through a campaign and debauched a great people on the theory that commerce was bad and that we should fence in our nation to prevent foreign trade? If we want commerce it is simple and easy to get it and will not cost a penny of cash nor a ship nor a man, and that is to open our ports and buy and sell. Will the world never learn anything? Here is the example of Hawaii before us. In 1876 we made a reciprocity treaty with Hawaii and we have had a commerce with that nation ever since. The laws of trade never know political boundaries and never care for political boundaries. All they know and care for is the right to buy and sell. Nothing else. Open your ports and the commerce will come. But when we have done talking of commerce then we talk of war, that we need this island to defend our western coast. And the astounding proposition is advanced to-night that we can spend money better for the defense of our coast two thousand miles away from it on a little island about a third as big as Cook County than if we spent it right here at home. Let us think of it for a moment in sober earnestness. An island two thousand miles away, nearly as far off as much of the European coast, with the whole British possessions on the north running the whole extent of our territory upon that side, with Mexico upon the south covering the territory upon that side, with

our eastern coast dotted with islands under foreign flags and our western coast guarded by the wide Pacific Ocean and no land for two thousand miles, and we propose to protect our coast by building forts two thousand miles away. Why, the only reason that any human being would ever contemplate such a move as this is explained by the fact that mankind are naturally jingoists and there is nothing on earth they like so well as a fight. Is this an American policy? I wonder how many reasoning beings there are in the United States who cannot distinguish the difference between annexing Florida, Louisiana and the West which nature placed here with no division line, which nature made a part of this one country, that cannot distinguish between that and annexing a lonely volcano out in the Pacific seas. Why, what is Hawaii? A little island not more than three times as big as Cook County and containing enough people, natives and all, to make one of our wards. An island that would never have existed excepting for a volcano, and yet you propose to go out and fortify this land to protect our coast when it is two thousand miles away. It would seem to me that the statement of the proposition was enough to brand it as the most absurd thing that reasonable people could possibly contemplate. What will we do with it when we get it? True, we can get it, because the band of political adventurers and pawnbrokers who have taken possession of Hawaii, or whatever you may call it, are wandering about the earth like a degenerated son of nobility, visiting pawnshops with the jewel case under their arms. If President Dole manages to get himself adopted by somebody, by us for instance, why of course he could turn over the keys. Anybody could do that who happened to have them, no matter what title he had to the case he turned over. He could do that, but then what will we do with the island when we get it? If it is the wonderful point for strategy that we are told, then it is a valuable possession for war. If that is true America to-day has no navy that can protect it in time of war. England had it. She planted her flag above it and could have held it yet. She could have taken it any day she wanted. She could take it now if the American flag was there, unless we spent millions of money and thousands of men to guard a lonely coast that is no benefit excepting a sentimental one to any honest human being who ever lived in the United States. How will we protect it? Why, if this island two thousand miles away is of any importance in war it would take a bigger fleet to protect it from the other people of the earth than is required to protect this land in which we live and which we know is ours to-day; and where would be the recompense? If we have money to spend and if we fear foreign invasion, if there are foes beyond the sea ready to grapple with the United States, then, gentlemen of the Sunset Club, we insist that the wisest policy would be to fortify our coast, to pro-

tect our cities, to take care of ourselves instead of going out into the wide Pacific Sea to annex every island that happens to peep its head above the waves.

If we take Hawaii, where will we stop? I insist there never was an American policy that could be appealed to for a single moment to support a proposition like this. The one solitary instance that could by the farthest stretch of imagination be made to apply to it is Alaska, which nobody wanted and nobody needed, and I suppose that is the reason we got it. But the people who took that would never have dreamed of going out into the Pacific Sea to annex the Island of Hawaii. Why? The gentlemen has advanced the position exactly of those who believe in it exactly, and I am glad that he has spoken frankly and enthusiastically to the Sunset Club upon this question. It is, as he says, the old, old question whether we will peacefully attend to our business at home, and solve the problems that press upon it, or whether we will be the vigorous progressive nation going out upon the earth, out upon the sea seeking to find other lands to make subject to our own. It is the question of whether we will follow in the footsteps of the fathers, or whether we will emulate Alexander and Napoleon and Caesar and England and Germany, and I am content to leave it there. It was never a doctrine of the fathers that this should be a land of conquest. I take it that belongs to the past and has no place in the civilization of to-day. It could not be civilization which could make such a doctrine a cardinal creed of national life. If we annex Hawaii just immediately we will find other islands still ready to be annexed. We will take the Sandwich Islands, the Fiji Islands, the Caroline Islands, and we can follow a chain of islands all down the north and south Pacific until we come up against Australia in one direction and Japan in another. We will take the whole of Oceanica with its thousands of islands or more and take our fleets and our men and burden our people for a false vain-glory of those who wish to make a progressive nation out of the United States. And then when we have reduced the Pacific to our possession we will turn our faces eastward. We will annex Cuba and the rest of the West Indies and the Bahamas and we will follow down the chain to South America and perhaps take in a state or two down there. Then we will go across and take the Azores, that are nearer than Hawaii, and round up by making a coaling station of Ireland and take that, too. Ireland is spoiling to be annexed. Ireland annexed us about thirty years ago and she wants to be adopted in return. Ireland would be the most wonderful point of strategy on the whole face of the earth. Why, if we had Ireland we would have the world. Then Caesar and Napoleon and Alexander and all the rest would not be in it. Even if they were alive they would not be in it. We would

train our guns on England and France and Germany, and, Lord, wouldn't we be a progressive nation?

Now I cannot think that anyone is quite sane when he talks about annexing Hawaii. I know that everybody likes a fight, especially if it is somebody else's fight. Some people like it for excitement, some like it to get rich, and some like it for one thing and some for another. Every one likes it except the one who has to fight and that is the only reason for any such departure from the well settled principles of government, and from the traditions of the United States. That is the only reason. Are we to go on in our mad career, not that we have commenced, but which some people wish us to commence? We have an example in Cuba. We see the once proud Spanish nation tottering on the verge of bankruptcy and ruin to defend an island occupied by hostile people, an island that could be of no possible advantage to Spain except by fraud and coercion and wrong. Do we wish to place ourselves there? You may point to the glories of Greece and to the glories of Rome and to the glories of France, but I say, gentlemen, that all who have carefully read history know perfectly well that in this wild career of annexation all these countries met the inevitable fate of dissolution which must come in the end.

I believe annexation is wrong, because it would be disastrous to the United States and because it would be ruinous to Hawaii. Two very good reasons. We have discussed this thing as if Hawaii had nothing to say about it. And she has not. The band of adventurers who have taken charge of Hawaii have not given her a chance to say anything about it and never will. We are the people and what are they who clamor for it? Why, one hundred years ago when Captain Cook landed upon the island there was something like 400,000 natives, and if they had served all the rest of the white men the way they did Captain Cook there probably would have been as many there now as there were then. Now the Hawaiians may be a very progressive nation, as shown by the celebrated example we have here this evening; but the world is big, and the sea is wide, and we have territory enough of our own, and I submit, gentlemen, that civilization could well have afforded to spare these few volcanic islands, and these few coal reefs that are just peeping up above the Pacific Sea, and left those quiet peaceful people in happiness and contentment to dream away as they wished. But we would not have it that way. We had to carry them the glorious blessings of our religion and our civilization, and they are gone. When Captain Cook discovered the island, as I say, there were about 400,000 natives. The Chinese brought them leprosy and they stood that pretty well, but they could not stand the western civilization. It was too much for them. Those people whom we took there to convert them found a peaceful, happy people, free from care,

basking away their lives in the sunshine of that warm climate, lulled to sleep by the murmurs of the warm sea and we were not content to let them alone. We might have let them live and die in happiness and peace instead of sending them our missionaries to make them unhappy while they lived, and give them a prospect of something a thousand times worse when they die. But we sent them and those missionaries taught them to read, and they became civilized, and then they died. Then they died. And to-day there are only about 10 per cent of the number that Captain Cook found when they met him, and served him the way they should have served all the rest, if they wished to protect their own. Now I cannot help sympathizing with the savages over this question. They may not be the highest type of men, but they were happy. They had no fear of a present and no fear of the future. We made them miserable. Our missionaries not only taught them the true religion, but they and their sons and the daughters that followed them managed to get three-fourths of their property, too. And they embraced christianity probably thinking it was a good thing from the examples they saw there about them. But it was too much for them. Now I rather think they were better off alive in the sunshine and dozing and dreaming in happiness and contentment than after we gave them our religion, our trusts, our strikes, our pulls, our newspapers and our trolley cars. I rather think they were better off.

This is a momentous question. A momentous question, not as the gentlemen says, a question of Hawaii, for it is not that. Again I say that no national policy would ever tempt us to annex that island, and that island alone. It is because we appeal to the fancies and the passions of men to send them forth on a wild crusade, that has wrecked every other nation that ever went before, and will surely wreck us in turn. You may take Hawaii, you may take all the islands of all the seas, you may take the West Indies, and the Bahamas, and the Azores, and take all the islands of all the seas, and you may build great navies, the greatest the earth has ever seen to protect you in your wild dreams and your mad desires, you may raise the strongest standing army that the world has ever known, and you may send these ships and these men broadcast over all the earth to satisfy your lust for greed—and some day these ships and these men, bruised and wounded, will come back to this land which our fathers left us and will find our own fair garden grown rank with weeds. Some day, so sure as we follow in this wild mad career that the jingoist is bound to make us take, we will find discord abroad, we will find ruin and desolation over these possessions which we have taken and we will find discord and contention at home. We will find the people staggering and reeling under that great load of taxation which is ever incident to a policy like this.

We will find this fair people of ours in the same position that the German subject, the French subject, the English subject confronted, when he fled to this land of freedom to escape a despotism and a military land. And last of all and more than all, when we have built this navy and manned these islands and placed this strong standing army within and without, we will find, as sure as history repeats itself, that this army which began by stirring up discord and dissension abroad will end by throttling the liberties of our people at home.

Just one more word. Gentlemen, it seems to me so wonderful that I marvel that men who soberly think can fail to see it. Everywhere all over the physical universe the hand of nature is higher and stronger than the hand of nations or the hand of men. Nature fixed the boundaries of nations as nature fixed the boundaries of the individual activities of men. Wide oceans, great lakes, impassable mountains, these have all stood out as nature's boundaries to the different nations that live upon the earth. Ages since, when by a great convulsion of nature America and Europe were separated, and the broad Atlantic rolled between, nature plainly marked this for the boundary of two great continents over which man should not step; and when nature, making this fair land of ours bordered by the Atlantic on the east, left one great fertile land whose western boundary was the wide, deep Pacific Sea, nature said as plain and loud as nature ever speaks, that here she meant to be the western boundary of the United States and woe to any man or any nation who follows not the clear, plain policy which nature made for nations and for men alike.

THE CHAIRMAN: The discussion is now open to any to participate, limiting them simply to five minutes.

MR. WM. J. MARSHALL: I am not sure whether I am an advocate of the annexation of Hawaii or not, but I should like very much to have Brother Darrow furnish us a little definite information on one or two points. He told us first that the Hawaiian Islands were about a quarter the size of Cook County; then he told us three times the size and then he told us seventy square miles.

MR. DARROW: I said seventy miles square.

MR. MARSHALL: My impression is they are nearer seven thousand square miles than any of the areas he named. He tells us that nature makes the boundaries between nations. Now it is very nice when nature does that. I have had occasion to study very carefully the question of settling the boundary between this country and England on the north, on the question of the Oregon acquisition,

and if I read the treaties aright three-fourths of that boundary is an imaginary line, the 45th degree of latitude between Vermont and New York and Canada and the 49th degree west of the Lake of the Woods to the Pacific. The natural boundary does not seem to fit somehow. I have also had occasion to study very carefully the whole subject of annexation of territory, and if Brother Darrow will go and read the annals of Congress for 1803-1804, he will find men quite as able and quite as patriotic as he, using precisely the same arguments against the annexation of Louisiana that he is using against the annexation of Hawaii, quite as bitter, and, in the light of what has happened since, quite as illogical. He tells us that the supporters of McKinley are opposed to trade. Now I did not think it was necessary to lug into the question of the annexation of Hawaii that very much disputed question of free trade and protective tariff. But if so I would like him to tell us how it happens that the exports and imports from 1890 to 1892 were greater than they had ever been before in the history of this government under the McKinley law. What they will be under the Dingley law we will know better two years from now. He tells us that we shall find a whole chain of islands strung all along the North Pacific and South Pacific from the Sandwich Islands to China and from the Sandwich Islands to Australia. Well, unfortunately the map is against him. I have had occasion a large part of my life to teach geography and the islands are not there except in his imagination. When you get two or three or four thousand miles away there is the chain of islands, but they are not a chain strung along from the Sandwich Islands to Japan. They are further away from the Sandwich Islands than the Sandwich Islands are from our coast, all those he names, every one of them. Now Mr. Darrow has never sailed a squadron; he has never commanded a fleet, but he is very prompt to tell us that that is not a good place to defend our coast. Now, I have never sailed a squadron or commanded a fleet, but if I want advice about business I go to a business man. If I want advice about naval and military affairs I don't go to a lawyer. Every single military or naval authority that has passed on the question has said that is the place to defend. And I think Captain Mahan and Admiral Belknap and General Schofield are worth on that question all the opinions of all the lawyers that ever studied in Chicago or elsewhere. Brother Darrow can doubtless give me some points on corporation law, and when I want any points on that I will, if I can afford it, fee him. When I want information on military points and naval questions I will go to naval or military authority.

I should also like to know a little more about that time when Captain Cook discovered the Sandwich Islands. My recollection is they had been discovered a long time before Captain Cook ever sat foot on them and that was not one hundred years ago, as he

says. That was just about the time of our Revolutionary War, which was pretty nearly one hundred and twenty-five years ago, if I remember rightly.

He tells us that Spain can only hold Cuba by war, as if we proposed, if we annexed Hawaii, to adopt the Spanish plan, which has always been that of repression of development. Read the story of the Spanish colonization of the west coast. Why didn't Spain know the riches of California? Because about 1543 she concluded that the least known about the country north and west of Mexico the better, and for one hundred and sixty years after that time not a solitary Spanish ship went north of Cape Mendocino, although annually the Spanish galleons passed that point on their voyages. If we propose to be another Spain, then the point is well made. I do not think any of us propose that.

They were a peaceful, happy people he tells us. Yes, they were. Captain Cook found them so when he went there, when, as our Chairman said, he was absorbed by the population. Who was that great king Kamekameha? I cannot get that exactly. Didn't he conquer all the other islands? Didn't he make his reputation by going to war? Were not they always at war? Now I am not a special advocate of missionary operations, and I am quite sure that some of them have been very ill-timed and ill-judged, but to charge on the missionaries the destruction of that population which was due far more to syphilitic diseases communicated by the sailing fleets that turned their crews loose there, does not seem to me quite fair, even in argument, against the annexation of Hawaii.

MR. SULLIVAN: Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen: I came here to-night for information, and I have received a great deal of it on both sides. I was pleased with all the speeches. I won't pick out anyone as being above the other. Now I am an annexationist. I will go even further than Mr. Darrow. You came from the Sandwich Islands, Mr. Chairman. I come from another island—Ireland. I am in favor of annexing everything you can that is good, and I do not believe with Mr. Darrow in his exposition of this proposed annexation of Hawaii. I supposed you came here to talk about the annexation of Hawaii, not of all the islands of the sea whether in the Pacific Ocean, or in the Gulf of Mexico. I happened at one time to have the honor of serving the United States as Consul at Bermuda, which has been referred to to-night. I found then and there that it was a great mistake that we did not own the Islands of Bermuda, and I think it is a misfortune to-day that we do not own them. They originally belonged to Virginia, and when Virginia became part of the United States, the Bermuda Islands should have been incorporated in this country. The Bermuda Islands are to-day the headquarters of the British North American fleet. I have seen

a ship there, a ship grand and great and powerful, sail from there and reach New York in fifty hours, 725 miles. That should not be. We should have those islands. The Sandwich Islands are the picket posts of the Pacific Ocean for us.

Those islands we should have and those islands we should fortify and those islands we should keep. It is impossible, you know, to answer a poet so brilliant and so grand as my friend Mr. Darrow. You cannot do it. He has the faculty of reaching up to the skies and down into the deep seas of the Pacific Ocean, and going on, you know, and captivating an audience as he captivated me. But at the same time let us come down to earth and see what is the truth about this matter. If we do not accept the offer made to us to annex those islands your children and mine will have to fight to take them. That is the fact of it, and they will stand a menace to this country upon the Pacific coast. I am certainly in favor of the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands. I do not say anything else. We are not discussing Cuba. We are not discussing the West India Islands. We are not discussing the Fiji Islands, or any of the other islands except Hawaii. That is the question before us to-night. It is the question before the country to-day. I am certainly in favor of the annexation of Hawaii, and I believe that, notwithstanding the Commercial Club with all its wealth and with all its intelligence, if a vote were taken here to-night we would be in favor of the annexation of Hawaii, notwithstanding what has been done by other bodies.

MR. JOSEPH W. HINER: Gentlemen of the Sunset Club: I cannot agree with Mr. Darrow in his statements that these islands have undergone no improvements since their discovery by Captain Cook. I understand that it was not very long ago, when, if a foreigner landed on those shores the intelligent mind of the islanders was immediately occupied with the question whether they would take him fricasseed, broiled or roasted; but now it is on record that President Cleveland sent an emissary over there and he came back in a very fair state of preservation. But I object to the acceptance of the gift of these islands from the present government, because I do not think the donor owns the gift that it would endow us with. The Hawaiian government to-day represents but 4,000 of the islanders. The constitutional convention, so-called, that adopted the instrument of government now existing in those islands, consisted of eighteen persons, one of whom was President Dole; and he of course took the precaution of having himself named in the constitution as president of the country, to hold until 1900, or until his successor was elected. A petition is now before the United States Senate signed by twenty-one thousand of those islanders protesting against annexation. What are you going to do with those people? I say now that if you take these islands with these Kanakas who

do not want to be annexed and with the polyglot rabble of Portuguese, Japanese and Chinese that you will be simply encumbering our beloved country with a vermiform appendix, and I think we have enough political disorders now. We should not add appendicitis to them, for that would be something no surgery could relieve us of. You can eliminate an offensive part from the human body, but you cannot eliminate it from the body politic. If we once get these islands we have got them forever. While the missionaries who went to the islands undoubtedly went there for a good purpose—I think they went there to pray—their descendants have learned to spell the word with an “e”—and as Mr. Darrow says, they have not only got a large part of the country, but at last they have succeeded in stealing the government. It is idle to say that we have got to have the islands in order to protect the Pacific coast. Our Atlantic coast has managed to get along for a great many years without our owning any of the Atlantic islands. About twenty-five or thirty years ago there was a very animated discussion in this country over the annexation of San Domingo, and our military and naval friends were just as positive as they are now, backed by as good an authority as General Grant, and they assured us that those islands were an important coaling station and if we did not get them some one else would. We were gravely informed that John Bull was lying awake nights seeking to gobble those islands, but we did not take them, and is there anyone who regrets it? England has not taken them and no country wants them. No country wants the Hawaiian Islands. It has been truly said that this is a very important question. I think it marks a momentous crisis in our history. Captain Mahan, who has been quoted to-night very freely, says that it is as important a question as that which confronted the Roman Senate when it was asked to occupy Messina and reverse the policy of centuries which had confined the territorial growth of Rome to the Italian Peninsula. Unfortunately there were jingoists in Rome those days, and they decided to enter upon a career of foreign conquest, and finally the empire was buried beneath its own ruin. They say we can get these islands for nothing. Why not take them? But if we take them we take them in disregard of the rights of their inhabitants. Some people say that these Kanakas are indifferent. A man whose argument I read the other day said that about 75 per cent of them did not care whether they were annexed or not. I say that is a great deal worse than if they were opposed to it. If they are absolutely inert, and do not care what flag they are under, there is no hope of ever making citizens of them. If they were hostile, opposed to us and capable of some reasoning, we might convince them that our government is the best for them. We might bring them over here and show them how we do things in this country. We might bring them right to Chicago and show them the first or the

nineteenth ward in the heat of an aldermanic campaign, or take them to the city hall and show them the Common Council in a state of eruption, or take them to Washington and show them the Senate of the United States in its great act of resolving that the government bonds should be paid in forty cent silver. Wouldn't that convince them? But if we take these islands, sacrificing the rights of its inhabitants, reversing the policy of centuries of good government, I say we will pay too dear a price for them, however rich they may be. It would be too dear a price if their volcano poured forth an unceasing stream of gold from its crater, or if the shores of Pearl Harbor were bedecked with precious stones. It would be too high a price under any circumstances. Let us adhere to our present policy. Let other nations seek them through aggressions if they will. Let the nations of Europe struggle with the eastern question. Let England struggle under the burden of her worldwide empire. Let Russia and Germany clutch with greedy hands the spoils of China. But let it be our nobler destiny to show the world that the true greatness of a nation is not in forts, and fleets, and colonies, and dependencies, but in the happiness and prosperity of the people, in their intelligence, industry and civic virtue.

MR. JESSE A. BALDWIN: Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen of the Club: While my friend and highly honored brother in the profession, Mr. Darrow, was speaking, I was reminded of how shocked I was a few days since upon being asked to answer the conundrum, "What becomes of the lawyer when he dies?" And the answer was "He lies still." I came here by the invitation of a friend in the hope and expectation, in which I have not been disappointed, of hearing this matter discussed in a way that should be helpful to the intellect, of course expecting that there would be an appeal to prejudice, to poetry and to pathos. I have been satisfied and edified. And I want to remark, in connection with the question still sounding in our ears, "Why should Hawaii be annexed?" and the answer that has been given, if we then asked ourselves the question, "Why should not Hawaii be annexed?" and answered it from what has been said to-night, the silence would be oppressive. If I mistake not, Mr. Chairman, the remarks of the gentleman who first spoke in the negative against the injustice of disturbing the peace and quiet of that beloved society out there in the ocean, a condition which he says is disturbed by the influx of this civilization, I thought I heard him pleading for the American Indians, and their protest being uttered against the inflow of civilization from the European coasts; and when later I heard the last preceding speaker follow the same line of argument and intimate that because there was a large percentage, if you please, in that island who were not quite sure whether they wanted to come under this civilizing influence

—and say what you will as to the civilizing influence—compare their condition with ours and say whether you will concede their condition is better than ours—so I say, when I heard them making that comparison, I was reminded again of the plea they might have been making for this large body of Indian settlers who occupied nine-tenths of our country when we fought the greatest revolution the world has ever seen, in principle. You may complain of it if you will, but that is the course of civilization. You cannot help it. The American Indians in this country once owned this broad land and had as good a title to it as those aborigines over there ever had to theirs. Nevertheless, the fact remains that when civilization comes along they begin to die out.

Again I ask you to stop and consider. My friend Darrow when he was pleading for the quiet and the peaceful condition over there, made me fancy I was listening to what existed here in this imperial city one hundred years ago, undisturbed except by the music of the frogs uttering their protest against the invasions of civilization crowding in here, putting up buildings, disturbing them in that manner. Now if that is the best argument he can make—and I always believe, when my friend has spoken, that the best word that can be said on that side has been said—I ask you again, why should not Hawaii be annexed?

MR. CARL STROEVER: Gentlemen: It seems to me that we cannot shut ourselves up in the United States. We have the example of China before us in the past. Not all the great empires that were striving for the domination of the world went to the wall, but small countries, just the same. That argument is fallacious. It seems to me that we stand in this world as a part of that great game of politics that is going on between nations and between races. We cannot shut ourselves out from it, even if we would. We will sometime be confronted with the question, "Shall South America be annexed by one of the European countries, parts of it by one country and parts by another?" Shall we meet this sort of thing? I believe the United States must uphold the Monroe doctrine. The question is, "Would the possession of Hawaii help us in that task or not?" Would it be politically beneficial to the United States to possess Hawaii? I believe it would. I believe also that the United States needs a large navy for that very same purpose. Much has been said here about the great cost of armies and navies. Look at Germany, look at England, the countries that are said to be borne down by their tremendous military establishments. Look at the marvelous prosperity and the marvelous progress which they have made during the last thirty years and then tell us that they are borne down by their military establishments. I venture to assert here, and I speak from personal experience, that there is hardly an

expense in the German Empire that bears as rich fruit as that which is spent upon her army, quite apart from the protection it offers to the country. I cannot go into that. I would like to suggest further as to the burden of a navy that we spend to-day about thirteen millions alone for stimulants and sweets. The navy of Great Britain costs about one hundred and twenty million dollars. We might be content with one that cost one hundred and fifty millions and bear the burden.

Nevertheless, I am not in favor of annexation under the present treaty, and I will tell you why. The present treaty provides that Hawaii shall be annexed as an integral part of the United States and as a territory. It provides further that the custom house of the United States shall be extended to Hawaii. It provides further that the United States shall assume a debt of four million dollars for Hawaii. Why should we undertake all these things and bring Hawaii in in that way, if we do not need her for anything else but a military station and a coaling station? Why should we undertake to govern Hawaii? I cannot see any necessity for it. It seems to me there are private interests behind this whole thing, and those interests are the Hawaiian sugar. Consider what it means. At present, it is true, we let Hawaiian sugar come in free, but the present treaty can be terminated by one year's notice. If that is done Hawaiian sugar, which comes in at the rate of about four hundred and fifty millions pounds a year, would have to pay four and a half million dollars a year in customs duty to the United States. Of course Hawaiian property owners see this whole thing. They see that the Hawaiian sugar industry is growing stronger and stronger in this country, and the people will insist some of these days that the Hawaiian reciprocity treaty be repealed. They then would lose four and a half million dollars a year. Of course there is a chance that possibly the sugar duty will be increased yet and that the sugar output will be increased, too.

MR. W. J. STRONG: I thought, Mr. Chairman, when I came here I would not say anything on this question, but after the debate started, I took my note book out and wrote a few notes, but I find my friend behind me (Mr. Stroeve) has been reading them and anticipated my speech. But to emphasize what he says on that line I desire to add my views as to Hawaiian annexation. There is one thing that I notice and that is that England does not want Hawaii, and if you ever found anything on the top of the earth that was any good and England did not want it I would like to know who does. The very fact that England does not want it ought to satisfy us it is not any good for us. I do think in all candor and all sincerity that the question we are confronted with here means much more than perhaps the majority of our writers and states-

men have seen fit to disclose. I believe that the prime motive back of the movement to-day to annex Hawaii is the sugar trust. I think I shall be corroborated by the gentleman who sits behind me, and who has made a study of the question, when I say that the foundation of the sugar trust rests wholly in its refineries, and if it can control the refineries of this country it can crush out the beet sugar industry. But when the farmers all over this country, who are developing the beet sugar industry, start up their sugar refineries, the trust cannot compete and the only show it has to fasten its tentacles on the people more firmly than it has already, is to increase four hundred millions a year to seven hundred millions a year that they may get the raw product cheaper and crush out our industries.

Another movement I think is back of this. I have not heard yet how the majority in Hawaii stand on the free silver question, and hence I am not wholly prepared to say whether I am in favor of annexation or not. It might be if there were in Hawaii a large majority in favor of bimetallism, I might consent. But I do think it is an attempt on the part of the trusts of this country, who are throttling our people to-day, to divert the attention of the people of this country from their own disgrace, by throwing upon the canvas of their minds the imaginative picture of war and the necessity of our protecting ourselves. Ever has it been thus, that when we have evils to cure they try to divert the attention of our people away off to something else. If our statesmen would address their attention to the evils that are confronting us, and that are crushing the life out of the industries of this country, and not attempt to divert our attention by talking of war, and saying that we ought to have coaling stations, they would be doing more for the glory of America than in talking about the annexation of Hawaii.

Now there was one remark made by my witty friend who followed Mr. Darrow, that when we wanted to know anything about military affairs we should go to military men. It has always been the case that military men are anxious for the aggrandizement of the military. If, back of this movement, is an attempt to create a large standing army, I say it is un-American. We do not want any big navy or large army to crush the people of this country. We can live without them.

Another traditional thing that the affirmative speaker dwelt on was the annexing of Alaska. Because we have made a mistake in annexing Alaska shall we make another mistake in annexing Hawaii? What has Alaska ever done for us? What good has it ever been to the United States? But the annexing of contiguous territory is a very different question from annexing territory that is not contiguous. We have a homogeneous people here, all speaking the same language, that we can understand from San Francisco to New

York, more alike than you can find in the different counties of England. Why should we go out in the Pacific to adopt a policy that has always been un-American and against the policy that the best statesmen of our country have always favored?

THE CHAIRMAN: I am very sorry not to recognize any other gentlemen, but the time for the discussion at large has passed, and the question now returns to the original speakers. Mr. Darrow has the floor.

MR. DARROW: There is very little that I care to add to what I have said about this question. My friend over there, the school ma'am, doesn't seem to know the difference between seventy square miles and seventy miles square. A man may teach a great many years and learn very little. He probably learned it years ago. We were also informed by the same authority, whatever it may be, that certain military gentlemen were the ones to inquire of in relation to whether certain islands were needed and what fortifications were needed. Now I do not believe it. I would no sooner consult a military man as to the correct policy of running a civil government than I would consult a prize-fighter as to the advisability of laws against assault and battery. I never heard of a military man yet who did not believe in war without any regard as to whether it was right or wrong. It is his trade and he is the last man on earth to consult in reference to civil government or the correct policy for a free people. Military government and the trade of war is one thing. The peaceful, orderly progress of a nation under civil liberty is quite another thing. America may take her choice, but thus far she has chosen the best she knew. She has chosen civil liberty instead of military government, and I say it will be a sad day for the American people when they depart from the traditions of their fathers, and build up standing armies and great navies to oppress her people at home and to provoke war abroad. What says this authority that has been so often quoted to-night—Captain Mahan? That the occupation of this little island two thousand miles away would be utterly useless without a great navy. And I take it, gentlemen, that it must go without saying, that as this is a strong military point it must need guns and men to protect it from the other nations of the earth. Are you ready, are we ready to pour out our money and our strength and our life to build up a navy for the sake of an island seventy miles square? I think not. I think that no person who will view this question as it is can dream of being so foolish as that.

We are told that there is not a chain of islands. Now I have examined the map. Between the Sandwich Islands and the Fiji Islands is some little distance. It is still further to the next. But it is much nearer in every direction than to take the first step. To

take the first step means the abandonment of a political and national policy to which we have adhered from the foundation of this government. I submit to you, gentlemen, that not one single argument has been made to-night for the annexation of this island that would not apply to any island in the Pacific, or any island in the Atlantic, if the question should arise. Not one. We were warned that we needed a great military power when we were threatened with trouble from Venezuela. Why were we threatened? Because a would-be statesman, for political purposes, saw fit to take the risk of plunging this nation into war without the slightest excuse on the face of the earth, without the slightest excuse. War over Venezuela. Of all the crimes in the chapter of war that men ever advocated, this was the greatest of all. What has the Monroe doctrine to do with this question? A doctrine that no foreign power shall be suffered to grow stronger on the American continent. It has nothing to do with it, literally. It has less to do with it theoretically. Less to do with it in principle. Can it be that there is a parallel between the occupation of Louisiana by the French, or of a portion of America by the English, and the taking of this island, which is to-day as far off almost as the whole of Europe? Can it be that those are parallel cases? Has there been one argument, and can there be one urged for the annexation of this lonely island that would not apply with tenfold force to every island on our eastern boundary? If an island two thousand miles away is needed to protect our western coast, an island six days off by the fastest vessels that sail on the Pacific Ocean—if that is needed, how much more are the islands needed that are only six or ten hours away from our coast? We have heard again and again the old statement that this island is now on the bargain counter and it is our last chance. The president of the republic is now hawking it to the nations of Europe, and we have to take it before the hammer falls. It is the same argument that the second-hand clothes dealer makes on South Clark street when he wants to sell you a suit of clothes, that there is another fellow on the next corner who is ready to take them if you won't. It is the same argument which the auctioneer makes with a bankrupt stock of jewelry, that somebody else will buy it if you do not bid right now. In view of the fact that no nation has been willing to take them, and that no nation has been willing to keep them, all must recognize that it could only be a bill of expense to the government and of no benefit to America or Hawaii if we should undertake a policy like this. It is a question, gentlemen, not of this island. It is a question of national policy. Every speaker here to-night who has advocated this extraordinary step has placed himself upon the only firm ground he could, that we should make of ourselves a nation of conquerors, who should go out upon the wide seas to annex all the territory that we could get.

I place beside that the doctrine of the fathers, that we should love peace and security and happiness; that we should turn our backs upon war and the trade of war and that we should lead the nations of the earth in the paths of peace and commerce and nothing else.

MR. HINMAN: Gentlemen, I shall only speak a moment or two, and that is in the hope of getting back to the solid ground of our country's history. We have heard a great deal from the speakers on the opposition regarding the traditions of our fathers. Where do they find them? Where do they find them? Not a single name has been mentioned. I defy these gentlemen to go back in our history to the Adamses, the Jeffersons, the Seward, the Monroes, the Polks, back to the time of Lincoln when Seward was Secretary of State, back to the time of Grant, down to Chester A. Arthur, to Benjamin Harrison, to William McKinley, and you will find the traditions of our fathers for the annexation of these islands. Why should a man go into the air and grasp from the stars generalities about a policy that never existed? Why, if there is any great name in our history which he can quote in support of the traditional policy he speaks about, does he not name it? The traditional policy of our government as I have told you and as you know by looking back in your history has been a policy of annexation, and if it had not been a policy of annexation, we should remain the thirteen states that we were in the last century and on our borders would be foreign nations and probably hostile nations.

Now, to illustrate the facility with which the opponents of annexation dodge history, I will quote on my honored opponent what he said regarding Venezuela. "A message issued without excuse." I will mention a piece of diplomatic history which probably most of you gentlemen have not heard. When Lord Salisbury sent his last letter which wound up the Venezuela correspondence—a sneering letter—no diplomatic style like it have I ever found in the diplomatic correspondence of any country—when he sent that letter he sent it purposely to insult the United States and here is how it came. He met Mr. Bayard, our facile ambassador to the Court of St. James, in Downing street, one day, and he told Mr. Bayard in response to many inquiries from Washington that that dispatch in response to Mr. Olney's letter had already been sent, that it was due that day in New York and that he would publish it in the morning papers in London. That is, he would publish his reply to this government before it got into the hands of this government, before it could be laid before Congress, with the deliberate intention of wantonly insulting our State Department, and the President of these United States. He may not belong to your party, he may not belong to mine, but yet he is our President. When that fact was tele-

graphed by Mr. Bayard to our State Department, Mr. Olney went to Mr. Cleveland, and Mr. Cleveland dictated the reply that that must be prevented at any cost and to telegraph to have Mr. Bayard tell Lord Salisbury that the consequences would be deplorable, if he deliberately insulted the United States in this manner. The telegram was sent, the United States was not insulted except subrosa, and hence came the Venezuela message, a message which was a message for peace and for arbitration, and not for war, but written in a severe tone on account of this insult that had been conceived and sent us from Downing street. That shows how far my honored opponent got from the ground of history.

Now, gentlemen, it is well enough for this gentleman to say that conquest has no place in modern civilization. I deny that this is conquest. But, gentlemen, we are dealing with conquering nations and that is what we have to remember. The reason we cannot annex the other islands is that they belong to other nations. They have already been conquered and annexed, and Hawaii is the next one. I have so many points to touch I won't have time to deal with all of them.

"If we take Hawaii where will we stop?" Right where we want to. "You cannot say A, B, C in politics and not X, Y, Z." You might as well say that because a man can vote at twenty-one he can at eighteen. You cannot follow these mathematical methods in politics. "The people who took Alaska would not have taken Hawaii." I beg to differ with this gentleman. He has not read his United States history in the last thirty years. The fact is that William H. Seward, the strongest advocate of the annexation of Alaska, directed attention to it repeatedly in his speeches and in his private letters as being the forerunner of our geographical commerce in the Pacific. It pointed directly to increasing that commerce at almost any cost and directly to the policy that we advocate in the present case.

Shall we remain pent up and clean up our domestic politics? Gentlemen, no country ever did that. You don't clean up your domestic politics by being pent up. Did England wait until she had purged her rotten burroughs before she pursued her colonial policy? No, she carried out her colonial policy first, and from the growth of manufacturers and the strength of the middle classes that she got from that annexation she got the power with which to cleanse her electoral system. In the same way Bismarck said in 1883, when he went into the colonial policy, that the German people needed diversion abroad, they needed expansion of their energies so that they would not sit at home and plan social democratic meetings and discuss the best means of overthrowing the government.

Adjourned.

HOWARD LESLIE SMITH,

Secretary.